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MOMENTKA: Použití strukturálních podmínek a QCA k odhalení zemí 
náchylných k eskalaci konfliktu 
TAKING A SNAPSHOT: Discovering Escalation Prone Countries Through 
Structural Conditions and QCA 
Kateřina Fridrichováa, Adriana Ilavskáb 
Abstrakt 
Tento článek představuje metodu předvídání eskalace konfliktů na základě dlouhodobých, 
strukturálních podmínek z otevřených zdrojů za použití kvalitativní komparativní analýzy 
(QCA). Kombinací těchto dvou prvků vzniká model a metoda predikce, která je v efektu 
predikce srovnatelná s dalšími, daleko sofistikovanějšími a lépe financovanými systémy 
a nabízí citlivější odhad eskalace. 
Abstract 
This paper introduces a method of conflict escalation prediction based on long-term 
structural conditions, drawn from open sources, and QCA (Qualitative Comparative 
analysis). The combination of the two components offers a model of prediction, which is 
comparable to other more sophisticated and resourced systems. Moreover, it offers 
a more sensitive estimation of an escalation. 
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“Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”  
Leo Tolstoy 
The so-called Anna Karenina principle points out a critical feature of the social world. 
There are few ways how to succeed in any given endeavour; the configurations of 
measures leading to success are few and relatively narrow with minimal deficiencies. 
However, there are myriads of ways how to fail. There has been a lot of research on both 
state success and state failure. That is why the search for causes of conflict has been 
expanding, and it includes dozens of indicators that given data and modelling can predict 
the conflict outbreak or conflict escalation. Nevertheless, there is no single one that 
explains the totality of the universe of conflict escalations. 
The conflict research is being done in two different but not entirely mutually exclusive 
modes, because these inform each other. The academic research is interested in 
methodology, theories, and data collection, evaluation and analysis as a part of effort 
seeking an explanation of the phenomena. The other mode is applied research – various 
early warning systems, which do all of the previously mentioned activities to provide 
policy guidance and help to shape preventive measures. And, of course, there is also the 
effort of intelligence agencies to inform policymakers about threats to their countries. 
The research in this paper falls under the latter, applied category, but draws heavily on 
the first. The research does not aim at discovering new insight into conflict research but 
creates a methodology of conflict escalation prediction and identification of threats 
emanating from such an event for the use of the Czech Ministry of Interior. Moreover, the 
model needs to be affordable for a country of the size of the Czech Republic and relatively 
easy to update. A research method able to provide formalised steps to analyse open-
source data provided by other countries or international organisations fulfils both 
requirements mentioned above. 
For the purpose of this article, the system is specified for regions currently considered 
most important for the internal security of the Czech Republic; it is not developed as 
a global warning system. The fundamental methodological approach is variable and could 
be adjusted to different regional groupings; specificity is achieved by including countries 
of the broader neighbourhood of the Czech Republic (Western Europe, post-communist 
and post-Soviet countries, Middle East and Northern Africa) into the model building. Their 
list is provided in Appendix 2. 
The innovation presented in this paper is a combination of two components previously not 
used together in the conflict prediction research: long-term structural data and QCA 
(Qualitative Comparative Analysis). These two components are naturally complementary; 
the creators of QCA originally devised it as a “macro-qualitative”. Its role is to analyse 
a presence or an absence of features at a “macro” level of large structures like political 
systems, states or classes.1 However, there has not been any significant attempt to try to 
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use it for conflict escalation prediction. In this respect, our proposed method is 
exploratory. 
The research question for building the model is under what conditions prevailing in the 
society does conflict escalate? The model takes a form of different paths (configurations 
of conditions) that had captured a country in a moment of possible conflict escalation in 
the past. These paths serve as a “snapshot” of society prone to a conflict escalation in 
the horizon of 1–3 years. As a next step, this snapshot is then applied to a current set of 
data and generates a list of countries emanating possible threats. We offer a list of 
countries generated for years 2019 and 2020 in comparison to other systems at the end 
of the paper (Table 3). 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Structural data 
Structural data are long-term conditions represented by indicators that change only slowly 
and describe the whole populations over longer-time periods (such as GDP, GINI index, 
annual water stress indicators, and population size). These data were the basis of the 
first generation of early warning systems and many of the conflict prediction models, as 
demonstrated, for example, in the work of Paul Collier.2 The nature of the data makes 
them useful for some tasks and unsuitable for others. Their long-term, almost invariant 
nature does not capture the dynamics of the conflict escalation for early warning purposes 
and the indicators are connected to the outcome only indirectly,3 since they are proxy 
measures.4 These then become better or worse predictors of a conflict; the so-called 
greed model (represented by indicators such as per capita income, economic growth, and 
educational attainment) outperforms grievance variables (such as political victimisation, 
access of power, economic inequality). However, the question remains whether this 
represents the real dynamics of the conflict escalation or captures a state of the 
country/society at the moment of escalation. If there are correlations of these variables, 
their potency changes in time and sometimes fluctuates dramatically,5 although most of 
                                                 
Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung [online]. 2005, Vol. 30, No. 4 (114) 
[cit. 30.06.2020]. Available from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20762081; BERG-SCHLOSSER, Dirk 
- Sven QUENTER. Macro-Quantitative vs Macro-Qualitative Methods in Political Science - 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Comparative Procedures using the Welfare-State Theory as an 
Example. Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung [online]. 1996, Vol. 21, No. 1 
(77) [cit. 12.09.2016]. Available from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20756014  
2 COLLIER, P. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers. 2004, Vol. 56, No. 4. 
DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpf064  
3 O’BANNON, Brett R. ‘Monitoring the Frog’ in Africa: Conflict Early Warning with Structural Data. 
Global Responsibility to Protect. 2012, Vol. 4, No. 4. DOI: 10.1163/1875984X-00404004 
4 DAVENPORT, Christian - Mark I. LICHBACH - David A. ARMSTRONG. Conflict Escalation and the 
Origins of Civil War. University of Maryland, 2005. 
5 BRAUMOELLER, Bear F. Only the Dead: The Persistence of War in the Modern Age. New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 139. 




the research presupposes their impact to be stable6 and linear7, e.g., joint democracy as 
a cause of conflict since 1820. In this sense, the configurative nature of the research does 
not depend on best predicting proxies, rather on a coverage of wider variety of social life, 
capturing the atmosphere in society which could contribute to conflict escalation. Chosen 
variables represent the main areas of indicators, which were often suggested by previous 
research, and they underline the focus on dynamics of societal changes. 
Early warning systems of newer generations supplement the long-term conditions by 
short-term variables sometimes referred to as “triggers”, “accelerators”, or “catalysts” 
when trying to monitor and evaluate the situation as it is developing on the ground. Where 
underlying societal conditions of malcontent, bad economic performance and state 
repression were structural conditions in the society, the self-immolation of a small 
businessman after his run-in with the police became a trigger of an uprising in the case 
of Tunisia. However, triggers are difficult to define; their ontological and epistemological 
status differs from the long-term ones. They are a contested notion in sociology and also 
in the study of revolutions.8 However, it is not just the sociologists, statisticians Blyth and 
Taleb point out the fact that one can hardly blame the last grain of sand for causing the 
pile to crumble, instead of the structure of the pile.9 Analogically, the notion of triggers 
appears in the conflict research. But one thing is sure: they are impossible to predict10. 
As a consequence, the systems of early warning, which need short-term input of real-time 
reporting on the ground, media monitoring and other similar techniques to capture the 
already ongoing events as they escalate, they are not modelling some kind of trigger 
events. The early warning systems then integrate these observations as an additional 
input of data. 
But even those events remain context-dependent – the material needs to be flammable 
for a spark to set it alight and countries need to be ripe for a conflict escalation for some 
triggering event to set it off. A draught is a cyclical phenomenon in the Middle Eastern 
region, but only under specific government policies and the inability of compensating for 
its impacts seems to be what sparked the revolution in Syria: 
“The humanitarian crisis that followed the 2006-10 drought can thus be seen as 
the culmination of 50 years of sustained mismanagement of water and land 
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resources, and the dead end of the Syrian government’s water and agricultural 
policies.”11 
Similarly, the theorised trigger of “stolen elections” is discussed primarily in the context 
of an electoral-authoritarian regime, where population and opposition feel like 
possibilities are taken away from them and the governing regime starts fracturing. This, 
in turn, leads to population mobilisation and attempts to change the results.12 
This context-dependence returns the role of the structural conditions as a possible tool 
for prediction under a suitable methodology. O’Bannon suggests that structural data could 
be supplemented by choice of a particular species of conflict (in his case, the herder-
farmer conflict in Africa), which would be an analogy to monitoring the so-called 
“indicator species” in the field of conservation biology.13 
“As with the frog that biologists monitor so closely looking for signs of 
environmental disturbance, emergent, low-intensity conflicts indicate the 
presence of social, economic, cultural and/or political factors normally resistant 
to simple observation, but which are known to be associated with violent 
conflict.”14 
When it comes to conflicts that influence the security of the Czech Republic, no single 
type of conflict has been yet identified that could play this indicator role. Moreover, given 
the diversity of the regions involved (Western Europe, post-communist countries, Middle 
Eastern and North African countries), diversity of situations for conflict escalation is 
expected. 
Using QCA 
As mentioned before, there is more than one way how society can break down, and 
conflict can escalate, and this needs to be taken into consideration. That is why we 
propose using QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis) to identify conditions which 
describe a country in a state of conflict escalation. 
In the extensive research of conflict escalation, tens of possible causes of conflict 
escalation had been identified and none of them standing alone can be declared as a sole 
cause of escalation. Neglecting this would lead to the false premise of causal 
homogeneity. It is necessary to cover various sets of causes and accept that causes may 
interact. Quantitative methods such as linear or logistic regression can address this by 
including interaction effects. However, the number of included interaction effects in one 
analysis is limited. 
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QCA has a unique combination of advantages of both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. It offers tools for systemised comparisons between a much larger number of 
cases than comparative case studies. Generalisation is one of the main advantages of 
quantitative approach but, due to the huge variability across analysed countries, also 
qualitative insight into individual cases is needed. As QCA is also standing in between 
qualitative and quantitative approach, it equalises broadness of the former with the 
deepness of case study knowledge provided by the latter.15 
Variants of QCA are available, however csQCA (crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis) 
was chosen as an initial variant for this model. There are several advantages to starting 
with csQCA, firstly, there is a natural dichotomous character of several conditions (see 
below: IRE/SEC, TER_CL, CONF_50). Forcing data from these variables into scale instead 
of keeping them dichotomous would cause serious problems in the results. Moreover, 
using csQCA helps when dealing with an unequal quality of the data and when adding 
missing values by a qualitative input. For example, operationalisation of variable “power 
access inequality” (EPR_UNEQ) to values on scale 0-1 would add even more researchers’ 
bias than the bias we have to face now. In such a case, it is analytically more 
straightforward to deal with binaries, which emphasise the qualitative aspect of the 
research. Additional nuancing of the model by employing fuzzy-sets might be a future 
endeavour. 
Using our model is akin to taking a snapshot at a point where society is at and then 
comparing it to pictures taken in the past. These pictures from the past consist of two 
piles – those of escalations which resulted in a conflict that produced at minimum 500 
BRDs in the timespan of an escalation peak and those where society pacified, did not 
escalate and no conflict of such scale followed. The result of the comparison is a list of 
countries that have an escalation-prone setup are chosen for closer analysis. 
It is possible to draw on open-source data and the system does not require substantive 
infrastructure because the databases are maintained by various international 
organisations and non-governmental and research bodies and enable some compatibility 
in the data. QCA as a research method has been described16 and applied17 to various 
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research questions in conflict research numerous times, and therefore only pertinent 
features will be described in this article. 
QCA is a method based on mathematical principles of Boolean algebra and set theory18 
suitable for capturing causal complexity in terms of identifying necessary conditions and 
combinations of sufficient conditions for escalation.19 It offers a formalised way to 
describe each case of conflict escalation and escalation opportunity within an indicated 
timeframe (1989–2016) by a series of structural conditions. These are operationalised 
based on previous theoretical research on conflict escalation and collected from reliable 
and sustainable databases (See Table 2: Explanation [Source]). After that, the collected 
raw data is calibrated into membership of sets (0 or 1), based on a qualitative anchor 
drawn from the qualitative research (see Table 2: Calibration and footnotes for these) 
and the qualitative nature of the observed data. 












1 0 1 0 … 1 1 4 0.75 
1 0 0 0 … 1 C 3 0.33 




This calibrated data table is then transformed into rows of a truth table.20 Each row is 
evaluated for its sufficiency for the outcome (PRI measure, see Table 1). The sufficiency 
measure is based on the ratio of cases with the same combination of conditions that lead 
to the conflict escalation to the total number of cases with that combination of 
conditions. Sufficient rows (those with the assigned outcome 1) are then used for the 
minimisation procedure using software which reduces the long description only for those 
features of the row that are insufficient by themselves but are a necessary part of 
a compound condition that is unnecessary but sufficient for the outcome. 
The main principle is to match the configurations in rows with membership to the set of 
outcomes (1) or non-membership to the set of outcomes (0). There is a possibility that 
the same configuration is matched with both 1 and 0 according to cases with that 
particular configuration. Based on the PRI measure (Table 1), it is not clear whether 
a significant portion of cases with the configuration led to the outcome or did not lead to 
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the outcome. The usual threshold is a minimum of 0.8 for the outcome and maximum of 
0.2 for non-outcome. However, this estimate is left to the researcher.21 The 
configurations with the PRI measure falling within the interval (0.2, 0.8) are labelled as 
contradictory (C). 
In this particular research, the causal analysis is not at the core, but the possibility of 
escalation. When trying to do causal analysis, the contradictory rows (their status as 
sufficient row is indeterminate) are then solved by various additional steps towards 
clarity. In our model, the overall coverage of the model (how many cases it includes) is 
more important than the consistency of the causal paths. We include rows with the 
consistency of 0.5 (there was an escalation in half of the cases in the row). After all, 
there is no standardised threshold that is binding for a researcher, and although higher 
measures are recommended, QCA is left to the researcher’s consideration.22 A society in 
this situation is conflict-prone at least as much as it is not and should appear in the list 
of countries indicated for further analysis. 
The type of the solution utilised for this model is the most parsimonious solution, which 
is an algorithm that takes all rows of the truth table sufficient for the outcome (all rows 
with the consistency of minimum 0.5) and all logical remainders (the possible 
combinations which did not show in the empirical cases) for Boolean minimisation. The 
effect is a simplification of the combinations of conditions for the model (paths to the 
outcome). 
The outcome of the Boolean minimisation is the recipe or the model for escalation, which 
is then (in the case of our project) used to sift recent data on the monitored countries. 
The user collects the same type of data for all states in the dataset for the last year (again 
country-year) and calibrates it according to the calibration anchors for the QCA model. 
Then the outcome model and the recent data are compared to each other, and only those 
countries which show similar combinations are included in the list for further analysis. 
The most parsimonious solution then generates a higher number of recent cases that 
might inflate the false positives. 
QCA is static – the principle of the analysis does not capture the dynamics of the case, 
which might be a problem when trying to discover the causality of a conflict escalation. 
This drawback does not pose a problem for our research because (in most cases) the yearly 
update of the source data and their long-term stability fit the use of the method for 
warning within 1-3-year horizon. This estimate is based on one-year lag on some of the 
variables (see Table 2: Data collected in time) and the span of the update of the open-
source databases and the amount of data the model can absorb. In other words, results 
from creating these “snapshots” enables comparison with a past picture, but the conflict-
prone setting of society does not mean the escalation is immediate, it can develop over 
time. 
The conflict may intensify slowly and develop for years. Therefore, the predictions are 
not relevant only for the year of the snapshot but also for few following years. Conflict-
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prone moods in special conditions in society does not last forever and the so-called 
conflict heat, if not transformed into escalation, would eventually fade out. 
BUILDING THE MODEL 
All analytical steps related to QCA and further steps for model building and predictions 
were performed in R, free software for computing and graphics, with packages QCA 
v.3.10.23 and SetMethods v.2.6.24 
Measuring Escalation and Escalation Opportunities 
The conditions (or variables) are calibrated into 1 and 0 according to membership in 
a particular set and so are analogically the outcomes of the cases. 
Escalation (coded 1): UCDP country-year at the start of a period called escalation peak. 
For this UCDP country-year escalation data are collected. 
Escalation peak is defined as a period of successive years when conflict reaches 25 BRDs 
yearly and 500 BRDs in total per the given period. Escalation peak is ended when the 
conflict falls below 25 BRDs per year. 
Setting the threshold of overall BRDs generated during a particular conflict enables the 
model to differentiate between configurations of conditions according to the level of 
intensity of a subsequent conflict. A low-level conflict that exceeds 25 BRDs every year 
for a decade but with a relatively lower number of victims does not generate a relative 
threat to the Czech Republic compared to a highly intense 2- or 3-year conflict with 
thousands BRDs. 
Escalation opportunities were coded 0. These are defined as cases where the outcome 
(escalation) could have happened, but it did not.25 They were operationalised as societal 
upheaval during a country-year which was qualitatively distinct by its severity and 
escalation potential (big protests in repressive regimes, political repression, 
extraordinary moves of populations). Originally, these were coded qualitatively; 
maximum five such opportunities were chosen for each country. Additionally, country-
years with 25 BRDs which did not lead to a prolonged conflict reaching 500 BRDs threshold 
were also coded as escalation opportunities. 
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Measuring the conditions 
The structural conditions were chosen for the model to cover several areas of conflict 
escalation theories and their proxy indicators – economic (poverty, inequality, youth 
unemployment), societal (power access, inequality amongst ethnic groups, population 
growth rate, irredentist/secessionist movements), neighbourhood (neighbouring conflict, 
territorial claims/demands), political (level of democracy, political terror), military 
(militarisation of the state). 
These conditions are chosen as long-term variables correlated with conflict escalation 
and they are usually chosen according to the theories26 they represent. But the goal of 
this model is not to analyse or even weight theories of escalation but to use conditions 
across societal phenomena to capture the state of society for building a comprehensive 
picture, instead of fitting it into any of the conflict outbreak or escalation theories, 
especially under the assumption that there are multiple ways of how countries end up in 
a conflict escalation. Variety of conditions is then more profitable for this use rather than 
one particular theory of conflict escalation; as has been pointed out, variables are proxies 
that might often fit into more than one escalation theory.27 In the choice of the conditions 
their availability and sustainability of the open-source databases also played a role.  
Every case in the model consists of a country and year; data for variables in those cases 
were collected mostly in the same year as defined in the case specification, but there are 
exceptions in 3 variables, as they were chosen to capture the state of society and are all 
structural and long-term. However, there is a slight difference in the reaction time of 
each variable, meaning that there is a difference in time in which the impact of changes 
in variables becomes evident in reality. As a simplified example - low GDP in a particular 
year has an effect on the society in the very same year, however a level of democracy in 
a particular year is a driving force for legislative changes the effect of which on society 
may become eminent only months later. Therefore, some of the variables were lagged 
when included into the process of model building (see Table 2: Data collected in time). 
The same logic applies to testing the current state of society – the “snapshot” against the 
previous escalations. When creating a snapshot of society in 2020, the data from 2020 
would be used for 10 variables and the data from 2019 would be used for 3 variables.28 
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Table 2: Conditions and Calibration 
 




Y_UNEMP  Modelled youth unemployment 
15 – 24 years [ILO]  
t <15 % = 0   
>15 %=1  
POV  Poverty measured through GDP 
per capita per purchasing 
power in constant dollars 
(2011) [WB]  
t <6.800 USD = 1   
>6.800 USD = 0  
UNEQ  Inequality (GINI post-tax, post-
transfer), [SWIID]  
t <33 = 0   
>33 = 1  
POP_GR  Population growth [WB] t,  
t-30 
<2 % = 0 
>2 % = 1  
EPR_UNEQ Power access inequality. Ratio 
of marginalised ethnic groups 
to ethnically relevant 
population. [ETH Zurich]  
t Inequality exists (= 1) if 
MEG (marginalized 
ethnic group) > 0.1 or 
EGIP (ethnic group in 
power) = <0.8  
Otherwise = 0  




t Movement exists = 1; 
does not exist = 0  
TER_CL  Territorial claim [Paul Hansel 
TCOW database/qualitative)]  
t Territorial claims from 
other state or territorial 
claims to other state = 1 
Otherwise = 0 
NEIGH_CON
F  
Neighbouring conflict during 
the same year or year 
preceding [UCDP]  
t and t-1 Conflict = 1 
No conflict = 030  
  
CONF_50 Conflict during last 50 years in 
the territory of the same state 
[UCDP]  
t Conflict = 1 
No conflict = 0  
PT Political terror scale [PTS]  t-1 
(lagged) 
3–5 = 1 
0–2 = 0 





Condition  Explanation [Source]  Data collected 
in time 
Calibration 




0-5 = non-democratic 
(0)  
6-10 = democratic (1)  
W_STR  Water stress [FAO UN] t Stress = 1 
No stress= 0 
MILIT Militarisation of society [BICC – 
Bonn International 
Center for Conversion]  
t-1 
(lagged) 
<600 = 0   
>600 = 1 
  
Source: Authors. 
THE 500+ MODEL 
The cases of 25 BRDs a year but not reaching the 500 BRDs threshold of an escalation peak 
were then recalibrated and put into the set of escalation opportunities in order to make 
the model differentiate the potential of the 500 BRDs minimum conflict in the countries 
of interest from a lower-level conflict, which does not have severe spill-over effects and 
remains contained on the territory of one country. The severity of the conflict that might 
threaten the security of the Czech Republic is much lower due to European integration 
and interconnectedness. However, creating two QCA models to reflect this fact would be 
methodologically unfeasible at the moment. Splitting countries into two groups would 
cause a reduction of cases in both models and analysing 12 conditions on fewer cases 
would lead to unsound results and be against the good practice of QCA. The threshold of 
500 BRDs could be changed to achieve higher sensitivity of the model for European 
countries. After checking the model’s results with reality and other models’ predictions 
(Table 3), the current threshold of 500 BRDs appears to be sufficient, and the analysis 
proceeds with it.31 
There are 11 paths generated representing about 90% of the cases of conflict escalation. 
Although higher coverage would be preferable, this is a satisfactory outcome. These paths 
capture multiple cases clustering the countries and cases into related types of conflict. 
Since there was no single explanatory theory proposed, the story told by each of the paths 
is different but awaits theoretical considerations and interpretations. 
  
                                                 
29 Sources used for choosing and setting calibration thresholds can be found in Appendix 1. 
30 PETTERSSON, Therése - Magnus ÖBERG. Organized violence, 1989–2019. Journal of Peace 
Research. 2020, Vol. 57, No. 4, 597-613. ISSN 0022-3433. Available from: 
doi: 10.1177/0022343320934986 
31 The regionality is not erased from the data beyond the model and is taken into consideration in 
the subsequent analysis, which is beyond the scope of the article. 




Table 3: Model of escalation 
PATHS CONSISTENCY 
~Y_UNEMP*UNEQ*IRE/SEC*~TER_CL 0.67 








POV*UNEQ*POP_GR*IRE/SEC*TER_CL*NEIGH_CONF*PT*MILIT 0.56  
  
TOTAL CONSISTENCY 0.72 
TOTAL COVERAGE 0.9 
Source: Authors 
LIST OF COUNTRIES AND COMPARISON TO OTHER SYSTEMS 
The abovementioned 500+ model is based on data from 1989 to 2016. The model was built 
using configurations of structural conditions leading to conflict escalations in a set of 
countries in Western Europe, post-communist and post-Soviet countries, Middle East and 
Northern Africa countries (provided in Appendix 2). The most recent data used for the 
model are from 2016 because more up-to-date data from 2017 and 2018 serve as testing 
data for an assessment of prediction abilities.32 The proposed model (paths in Table 2) is 
used as a sieve for the data from 2017 and 2018 and it generates a list of conflict-prone 
countries, in which escalation is probable. The state of society in those years is being 
analysed and compared to the pictures of societies in the model built from the 1989 – 
2016 data. If a “snapshot” of the current society in any state matches the picture from 
the past with escalation as a result, this country is added to the list of potentially 
dangerous countries (see Table 3: OUR MODEL). These results tell us that in the listed 
countries, there is a configuration of factors representing escalation of conflict in the 
past. 
                                                 
32 Application of the proposed model would require extending the dataset used for model building 
by the years 2017 and 2018 to create a model based on the period 1898–2018. Then the list of 
conflict-prone countries would be generated based on the 2019 data. 




However, potential risk identified by using the 2017 data is not relevant only for the year 
2017. The proposed model identifies the rising heat and tensions in societies, which can 
develop slowly over months or years until they grow into the conflict. Therefore, by 
creating snapshots in 2017, the following years 2018, 2019 and 2020 are also addressed. 
The same case of creating snapshots in 2018 alerts on potentially dangerous countries, 
being relevant also for the years 2019, 2020 and 2021. 
The proposed method for prediction is exploratory and evaluation of its performance 
requires a non-standard method as well. Estimating values similar to goodness-of-fit 
measures for the model is not possible because of the configurational approach. The 
model contains configurations which led to a conflict in the past. It would find all the 
previous cases of escalation because all of them explicitly define the model. 
Table 4: Countries Generated by our Model Compared to Two Global Systems – ICRG 
and GCRI 
OUR MODEL ICRG GCRI 
BRDs from 2017 to 
2020 
AFG - AFG 92466 
EGY - - 1980 
GEO - - 0 
IRQ IRQ - 21203 
LIT - - 0 
MDA - - 0 
PAK PAK - 2095 
RUS - - 177 
SDN SDN - 1712 
SSD - SSD 1856 
SYR SYR SYR 79147 
TUR - - 5278 
UKR - - 1138 
TJK - - 0 
- - NGA 6825 
- - MNG 0 
- SOM SOM 7996 
- YEM - 11830 
- ZAR - 0 
Source: Authors 
 
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), provided by PRS Group, is one of the 
principal political risk methodologies. Every year, the set of indicators of risk in different 
areas (Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption) is computed and 
combined into the overall risk score. Final results are not available, PRS Group provides 




free access only to partial scores.33 ICRG covers 140 countries all over the globe; however, 
a few countries with a non-negligible impact on the Czech Republic are not included: 
e.g., Afghanistan, South Sudan, Bosnia and Hercegovina and a few post-communist 
countries.34 The advantage of the proposed method over ICRG is its broader coverage of 
countries and accessibility. Using open-source data it enables the replication of the whole 
risk computation process with minimal expenses. The crucial question is the precision and 
reliability of both systems. A partial score for Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
was used for the comparison with the results of our model. Countries with a score below 
0.5 in years 2016-2018 were chosen as potentially risky. 
The second system in the comparison is the Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI). Relying on 
the results of the regression model,35 GCRI provides estimates of the probability and 
intensity of conflict in foreign countries. Quantitative conflict risk model by the European 
Commission and the proposed method both use structural variables and are based on 
open-source data. Therefore, using GCRI can solve the problem with accessibility, but 
still has the issue with coverage as the system is focused solely outside of the EU borders. 
Potentially risky countries were calculated with the high violent model probability 
equation for the national dimension with data provided by the European Commission Joint 
Research Centre. All countries with probability higher than 2% were included. 
Table 3 presents the results of the comparison of all three models. The substantial 
difference seems to be in the sensitivity in some cases. In addition to the list of countries 
generated by ICRG and GCRI, our model is also alerting to Egypt, Mali, Russia, Turkey, 
and Ukraine. Conflict situations in all five countries have an impact on the threats for the 
Czech internal security; therefore, the five particular cases should be reflected when 
trying to prevent those threats. We achieve higher sensitivity by applying QCA; it enabled 
us to use different combinations of conditions valid in different parts of the world and 
apply them outside their regional context.  
By including every single case of previous escalation opportunity in the analysed area, the 
model can also detect minor variables combinations leading to a conflict. The influence 
of these variables could fade away in the GCRI regression model. The identification of the 
risk of escalation in countries is systematic, and the procedure is transparent. 
Transparency is the advantage over ICRG because anyone can perform analysis and even 
modify and improve it. 
Emphasis on the sensitivity also has a drawback in the form of generating false positives 
– Georgia, Lithuania and Moldova (at least false so far). There are certainly ways of 
improving the prediction model, such as including an additional condition that would be 
of shorter duration. Still, the inclusion of triggers themselves is epistemologically 
impossible since the problem of defining what a trigger is hinders the way forward. After 
all, disturbance of stable systems, the so-called “tipping points” are impossible to 
                                                 
33 POLITICAL RISK SERVICES. The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) [cit. 25.09.2020]. 
Available from: https://bit.ly/342TqAx  
34 Ibid. 
35 HALKIA, Stamatia et al. The Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI) regression model: data ingestion, 
processing, and output methods. [online]. LU: Publications Office, 2017 [cit. 25.09.2020]. 
Available from: https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/303651  




predict.36 However, the possibility of measurable proxies that are less stable in time but 
possible to capture on a month-to-month basis are still an opportunity for further 
research. Another possibility would be splitting the countries into more regions, but this 
would require recalibration of the conditions or even collection of new ones with the 
defined regionality, which would complicate it beyond its current parsimonious and 
relatively simple functionality. 
Quality of the Model 
There were overall 5759 data inputs and we encountered the problem of missing data for 
some years or some of the countries accounting for 1.72% of data. Variables were affected 
to a different extent, major influence of missing data was on IRE/SEC and W_STR. 
Regarding countries, data were missing especially for Yemen and Libya, however, the 
missing data for these countries did not exceed 40%. Therefore, the first step of filling 
the missing cells was a qualitatively informed input of data - missing data for some 
variables were collected from other databases or qualitative sources and their consistency 
with the available data was checked.  
Step two for data that could not be filled by the qualitative method was interpolation 
using linear regression; step three was the use of random data. Random data were used 
to fill missing values in raw data, random number had been drawn from uniform 
distribution, minimum and maximum were based on the min and max values from the 
values available for the particular variable. Random values account only for 0.45% of the 
final data. For evaluating the stability of the outcomes, the random input was iterated 
fifteen times, and the comparison shows a high level of stability of the model – the model 
is not case sensitive. 
Picture 1: Stability Analysis for Random Values 
 
Source: Authors. 
                                                 
36 TALEB – BLYTH, ref. 9 
 





In addition to the stability analysis, another way of ascertaining that the model describes 
what it should be describing is to run it for escalations of 25 BRDs a year. This step showed 
that the model certainly differentiates between countries which are stable long-term and 
where the expectation of conflict escalation is very low (the overwhelming majority of 
West European countries, Central European countries of the post-communist block) and 
those that are unstable. In terms of methodology, this gets demonstrated by the fact that 
the cases in a contradictory row represent the same country, only in different 
timeframes, but they are not contradictory to cases representing stable countries. The 
case clustering, according to social reality, works reliably in this application of QCA thanks 
to the multiple conditions included in the model. 
CONCLUSION 
The presented method of conflict escalation prediction combines the assessment of 
structural conditions and QCA results in the identification of countries in which escalation 
is possible and probable. It leverages the fact that QCA enables to investigate 
conjunctural combinations of conditions that describe a society going into conflict 
escalation and the fact that long-term structural conditions are collected by open-source 
databases and easily available to potential users. Similar kind of risk alert is not new, but 
the proposed model can offer a few advantages over the established systems when 
reflecting the specific needs of the Czech Republic. 
Our system has the advantages of being a localised and relatively cheap method of conflict 
escalation prediction, which functions as a source for further probability and intensity 
estimation and scenario building tied to the threats emanating from the countries of 
conflict escalation. A specific scenario building method is designed to work with the 
abovementioned model of prediction, but its description is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Institutional users, such as intelligence agencies or policy-making bodies, would 
certainly need to complement this system with regional intelligence gathering on the 
ground or targeted analyses of specific threats, however, this system offers 
a systematised way of specifying targets of focus and additional sources. 
The model performs well in comparison with much larger and sophisticated systems 
of conflict prediction that also use long-term structural data. There are still possible ways 
to improve it, possibly by introducing shorter-term conditions in order to improve the 
time sensitivity of the predictive model. Additionally, the model might be nuanced by the 
introduction of fsQCA, but this needs to be tested and improved in further iterations. 
Still, as demonstrated above, the model shows a lot of promise. 
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